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Abstract
How are masculinity and nationalism intertwined? This question has received scant
theoretical attention, and existing theories tend to focus on their shared ideals and
are embedded in a heteronormative, homophobic, and patriarchal framework. Such
views imply a static relationship between the two phenomena and are incompatible
with the recent phenomenon of homonationalism and the incorporation of some
homosexual bodies within the nation. Addressing this theoretical gap, this article
develops a more holistic framework of the relationship between nationalism and
masculinity. Drawing on relational sociology, it conceptualises nationalism as
competing masculinities. It argues that the link between masculinities and nation-
alism is not found in their overlapping substantive ideals, but rather that the two
phenomena are co-constructed through their overlapping Othering processes. The
proposed theoretical framework does not only provide a more dynamic understand-
ing of the link between masculinity and nationalism, but it also helps to overcome
the apparent duality between homonationalism and heteronationalism. It is shown
that both phenomena are in fact two sides of the same coin, with the main difference
between them being the location of homophobia as a technology of Othering within
different types of Self/Other relations. Overall, the article provides an analytical
tool that allows for the contextualisation and understanding of seemingly contra-
dictory features of nationalism and its relationship to masculinity.
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Nowadays, it is not controversial to proclaim that nationalism is a masculine enterprise
(Elias 2008). In his influential work The Image of Man: The creation of Modern
Masculinity, Mosse (1996) argued that ideas of what it means to be a good (modern)
man were from the very beginning co-opted by the nationalist movements of the
nineteenth century. Doing so, he demonstrated how nationalism and masculinity are
inherently intertwined. Although this view is widely accepted, theoretical explorations
of the relationship between masculinities and nationalism remain limited. The predom-
inant conceptualisation of this relationship focusses on and emphasises the overlapping
traits of nationalism and hegemonic masculinity (Nagel 1998). Such a view, however,
is not able to account fully for the processes of social ordering and hierarchy construc-
tion that underpin both phenomena. This article seeks to address this gap by providing a
more complex theory of the nationalism/masculinity relationship. Drawing on relation-
al sociology, it introduces the notion of nationalism as competing masculinities to
highlight how nationalism relies on masculine technologies of Othering to distinguish
itself from other nations.
Using gender as a tool of analysis, the article contributes to the feminist literature on
nationalism. Whereas this literature has criticised the canonical theories on nationalism
for their (implicit) erasure of women from history as well as their (unconscious)
reproduction of the problematic public/private distinctions (Yuval-Davis 1997), it has
also showed a tendency to consider that Bgender equals women^ (Nagel 1998). In other
words, gendered theories of nations and nationalism Bhave too often treated men and
masculinity as stable, undifferentiated categories, and have posited a straightforward
equation between male interest, masculinity and nationalism^ (Bracewell 2000, p.
566). The role of men and the impact of nationalism on men and masculinity have
been explored to a much lesser extent.
An important exception to the trend is Joane Nagel’s 1998 article Masculinity
and nationalism: gender and sexuality in the making of nations. A contribution that,
to date, remains the seminal work on the relation between nationalism and mascu-
linity.1 Nagel argued that nationalism and masculinity are intertwined for two
reasons. The nationalist project is a major avenue for the accomplishment of
masculinity because 1) Bthe national state is essentially a masculine institution^
(Nagel 1998, p. 251; see also Connell 1990), in which the dominant patriarchal
gender relations are reaffirmed, and 2) because Bthe culture of nationalism is
constructed to emphasize and resonate with masculine cultural themes^ (p. 251).
Although she acknowledges that both nationalism and masculinity are hegemonic
structures, Nagel explains the relation between the phenomena by highlighting their
substantial overlap and the fact that Bthe ‘microculture’ of masculinity in everyday
life articulates very well the demands of nationalism^ (p. 252).
1 The focus on Nagel’s work in this article is not to suggest that there are no other literatures that consider the
link between the nation and masculinity or homosexuality. Indeed, within the field of international relations,
Cynthia Weber (2016) has provided a strong poststructuralist account of the role of the homosexual within the
construction of the state. Additionally, scholars dealing with sexual violence in wartime, particularly focussing
on the male victims (see, e.g., Dolan 2002), and historians have provided important contributions to the ideas
discussed here (see, e.g., Tosh 2004; du Pisani 2004). However, these different discussions have not found
their way into the literature on gender and nations/nationalism. The latter instead tend to depart from Nagel’s
work when discussing the intersections between nationalism and masculinities.
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Although Nagel’s contribution (1998; but see also 2003) cannot and should
not be underemphasized, it has its limitations. Most importantly, her view on
why nationalism and masculinities are so closely related relies too much on a
substantialist tradition of thought.2 Indeed, by highlighting their shared substan-
tive features—something that is taken as a central point in the literature derived
from Nagel’s article—Nagel relies on a particular notion of nationalism and
masculinity that is embedded in a heteronormative, homophobic, and patriarchal
framework. I question this substantialist view for two reasons: 1) the focus on
shared features does not allow for the possibilities of different expressions of
masculinities and nationalism to be connected, and 2) it implies a static relation-
ship that does not change over time. For example, the specific reading of
hegemonic masculinity in Nagel’s work, which excludes homosexuals from the
nation, is incompatible with the recent phenomenon of homonationalism (see
Puar 2007) in which some homosexual bodies are deemed worthy of the protec-
tion of the nation.
Addressing this theoretical caveat, I develop a more holistic framework that is
able to encapsulate these different forms of nationalisms and overcome the apparent
binary between (hetero)nationalism3 and homonationalism. I make the case for a
relational theoretic approach to conceptualise how masculinity/ies and nationalism
are intertwined. To do so, I draw on relational sociology, which has suggested that
categories should not be seen as stable units, but rather as situated within relations
that are Bpreeminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes^
(Emirbayer 1997, p. 289). This theoretical tradition suggests that we should not
analyse the world through its Bcategories^ but rather through its processes.4 Impor-
tantly, a relational approach Ballows us to imagine that a process is mutable in
relation to space and time, as are the mechanisms established to promote it^ (Eyben
2010, p. 388). Thus, rather than focussing on how the substance of the Bculture and
ideology of hegemonic masculinity go hand in hand with the culture and ideology
of hegemonic nationalism^ (Nagel 1998, p. 249), this article seeks to examine the
processes through which the hegemonic hierarchies of masculinity and nationalism
are maintained. It argues that the link between both can be found in their similar use
of technologies of Othering.5 Focusing on the location of homophobia as a mutual
technology of Othering within these processes,6 it contends that nationalism can be
conceptualized through the notion of competing masculinities.
2 A theoretical stance that is arguably in sharp contrast with the emphasis on the flexible nature of national
boundaries elsewhere in her work (see, e.g., Nagel 2003).
3 Heteronationalism is here used to refer to heteronormative nationalism that relies on the exclusion of
homosexuals from the nation.
4 This, of course, does not mean that Bsubstance^ or categories do not matter (as they are real in their effects),
but rather that they are always embedded within their relational context and, as such, should not be taken as an
analytical starting point.
5 The notion that gender hierarchies are a process is not new and has been central to the work of Judith Butler
(2004), who also has reflected on how this relates to kinship and nation.
6 Location is here used to cover both how homophobia is used as a technology of Othering and in which type
of Self/Other relation it is situated.
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By considering homophobia as political,7 a (masculine) technology of Othering, this
article also contributes the current discussions on sexuality, homophobia, and nation-
alism. Whereas this literature has focussed on how homophobia is used to police the
nation’s sexuality to ensure the biological continuation of the nation (see, e.g., Mole
2011, 2016, but also Peterson 1999), the argument in this article demonstrates that
homophobia as a technology of Othering can also be used to organise and maintain the
gendered hierarchy within and among nations.
This theoretical argument is presented as follows. The first section briefly reviews the
construction of boundaries in nationalism throughOthering, followed by a brief overview of
the Othering processes of masculinities. The third section conceptualises nationalism as
competing masculinities by the examining three different ways through which masculine
and nationalist technologies of Othering overlap. The last section considers the location of
homophobia as a technology of Othering in the phenomenon of homonationalism.
Nationalism: othering and the imagining of the nation
Considering that, for the most part, the canonical literature on nations and nationalism has
treated nations, nationalism, and nationalist movements as non-gendered phenomena (See
Racioppi and Osullivan See 2000),8 it is beyond the scope of this article to provide an in-
depth review of that literature. This, however, does not mean that this scholarship is not
relevant for the current argument. Consider, for example, the work of Anderson (1991
[1983]) and Horowitz (1985). Although not tackling the issue of gender themselves, their
emphasis on the constructed nature of nationalism has been instrumental for the gendered
analysis of nationalism.9 In the remainder of this section, I draw on both authors to
highlight how the nation is constructed through Othering processes.
7 Homophobia in this article is not understood as the individual prejudices against homosexuality but is rather
conceptualised as a political tool, akin to Bosia and Weiss’s (2013) concept of political homophobia. Thus,
homophobia, at conceived in this piece, relates to claims of belonging (Boellstorff 2004) and is to be situated
within the Bprocess of […] self-definition and legitimation^ which Bhelps to explain how authorities [but also
societies more generally] create a ‘we’ among the majority of citizens, at the cost of framing a minority as
outsiders^ (p. 20). In line with relational sociology, this definition of homophobia as a political tool
emphasises the Bpolitics and process of collective identity and the invention or imagining of political traditions
and practices that forge and enforce those identities^ (p.20, emphasis in original). Thus, homophobia here does
not relate to the prejudices against homosexuality, but is rather a political phenomenon that organises the
hierarchical relations of belonging. It is a disciplining mechanism of masculinity that operates through the fear
of being associated with homosexuality and/or an effeminate type of masculinity. It is technology of Othering,
both on the micro and macro level, that produces and maintains the distinction between the Self and the Other
by projecting any undesired (effeminate) element of the Self onto the Other.
8 Some early exceptions are, e.g., Enloe (1989) and Mosse (1985).
9 Although this article focuses on nationalism, due to its emphasis on processes of boundary making and
maintenance, the argument can be extended to the literatures on race and ethnicity—doing so explicitly is
beyond the scope of this article. To demonstrate the overlap, consider the Nagel’s (2003, p. 6) definition of
ethnicity and nationalism, in which ethnicity is defined as the Bdifference between individuals and groups in
skin color, language, religion, culture, national origin/nationality, or sometimes geographic region [which]
subsumes both nationalism and race.^ As such, nationalism can be considered to be Ba particular kind of
ethnically based social identity or movement generally involving claims to statehood or political autonomy,
and most often rooted in assertions of cultural distinctiveness, a unique history, and ethnic or racial purity^ (p.
6). Similarly, see also the work of Yuval-Davis (2011) on the politics of belonging and the intersectional and
contested politics of boundary making/maintaining in which Others are excluded or oppressed.
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In his work, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz (1985) seeks, amongst other aims,
to understand the nature of ethnic affiliations and how they construct the nation. He
highlights the flexible nature of ethnic group boundaries. These boundaries, he claims
Bare made of neither stone nor putty. They are malleable within limits, [… and] tend to
shift with the political context^ (Horowitz 1985, p. 66). One of the key points made by
Horowitz (1985) is that the process of defining these boundaries is a guided practice in
which community leaders and other elite figures make political choices to emphasise
differences (differentiation) or similarities (assimilation) to emphasise a certain already
(latently) present identity. Similarly, Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 6), in his seminal
work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,
defines the nation as Ban imagined political community—and imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign.^ The nation, he argues, is a community, which is
Bregardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, […]
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that
makes it possible […] for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly
to die for such limited imaginings^ (Anderson 1991, p. 7, emphasis added).
Anderson’s work is of particular interest when analysing how nationalism and
masculinity are intertwined because of his description of the nation as a fraternity
(see also Pateman 1988) and his exposure of the cultural construction of the nation.
First, by referring to the nation as a fraternity, Anderson (1991) alludes to the gendered
structure of nationalism as well as the potential role of masculinities within the
construction of the nation’s boundaries. If the nation is conceived as a club of men, it
is not a far stretch to argue that the process of defining boundaries is framed in
masculine terms, as I demonstrate below. Second, by unpacking the cultural construc-
tion of the nation, Anderson highlights the importance of boundary construction in
nationalism. A nation is defined by its internal unity (Eisenstein 2000) and is con-
structed in opposition to the BOther,^ the outsider (Mayer 2000b). It requires both Ban
inside and an outside—natives and foreigners, immigrants, refugees, and the people
coming from the outside^ (Eisenstein 2000, p. 37). Consequently, nationalism is never
just confined to what lies within, but rather the Bdiscourse of nationalism is inherently
international. Claims to nationhood are not just internal claims to social solidarity,
common descent, or any other basis for constituting a political community. They are
also claims to distinctiveness vis-a-vis other nations^ (Calhoun 1993, p. 216). Thus,
because the nation Bis defined by the dissimilarities […] imagined or perceived to exist
between itself and others^ (Harrison 2003, p. 343), it can be conceived to be a Bseries
of moving boundaries^ (Nagel 2003, p. 44). These boundaries are maintained by both
physical and symbolic markers of who is part of the nation and who is not.
From the above, it follows that, in the process of constructing the nation, the
definition of who is excluded from the ethnic group is at least as important as the
question who is included, if not more so. This in turn draws attention to the process of
BOthering^ in the construction of the nation’s boundaries. Othering is understood as the
process of Bdifferentiation and demarcation by which the line is drawn between ‘us’
and ‘them’ […] and through which social distance is established and maintained^
(Lister 2004, p. 101). It is a process Bwhereby a dominant group defines into existence
an inferior group^ (Schwalbe et al. 2000, p. 422). As a process, Othering implies the
essentialisation and reduction of Bthe Other^ to a few negative and stereotypical
characteristics, ultimately dehumanising them (Jensen 2011, p. 65). It is important to
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note that the BSelf^ and the BOther^ are inherently related and dependent on each other.
First, Othering is a process of disavowing, censoring, or systematically forgetting of
certain kinds of field similarities and shared features of the Self and the Other (Harrison
2003). Second, the Othering process does not simply valorise the Self whilst vilifying
the Other, but involves
a double movement, where the Other is simultaneously emulated and repudiated,
admired and despised, and the source of this ambivalence is the recognition of Self
in Other. That is to say, the Other represents a kind of screen upon which both the
despised and the desired aspect of the Self can be projected. (Sax 1998, p.294)
Relating these observations back to the nation, it becomes clear that the process of
B[d]efining ‘outsiders’ […] is part of the process of designating ‘insiders’ and ‘citizens,’
and thus of defining the nation itself^ (Nagel 2003, p. 147). Nationalism tries to
assimilate anyone different from the norm (homogeneity within the nation) and excludes
anyone it cannot (Othering) (Marx, cited in Vickers and Vouloukos 2007, p. 531).
To further conceptualise the practices through which the Other is excluded and
dehumanised, I turn to Dehzani’s (2008) notion of technologies of Othering, which is
defined as
an amalgamation of political discourses and practices designed to transforming
the Bdifference^ into Botherness^ and punishing those who are different for being
Bother.^ A technology of othering is a political strategy of marginalization,
domination and elimination of the Bother.^ Its techniques ranges [sic] from
exclusion from political discourse and discrimination, to extermination through
state-sponsored violence. (Dehzani 2008, p. 13)
Technologies of Othering is related to Foucault’s (1988) technologies of Self. Although both
consider technologies as a set of discourse practices, the have a fundamentally different
outlook on identity construction. Whereas Foucault’s technologies of the self capture the
productive forces of the ethical techniques through which modern Western identity is
constructed, technologies of Othering focus on destructive forces. Rooted in the philosophy
of Heidegger (1977), technologies of othering focus on the abjection, rejection, and, in some
cases, the persecution of the Other. It is useful to analyse the hegemonic structures of
nationalism andmasculinity as it draws attention to the political nature of Othering processes.
Indeed,Othering does not simply highlight the differences between the Self and theOther, but
it is inherently hierarchical in nature. It is based on an implied, particular, and dehumanizing
ordering of groups of people. Those that are being Othered are reduced to objects/abjects,
ready to be used and then discarded or even destroyed when no longer needed. This process
strips the Other of their humanity and when taken to the extreme even allows for the mass-
atrocities witnessed during genocides and death camps (Dehzani 2008). Through the notion
of a technology ofOthering, it can be pointed out that B[o]nce a group of people, a culture or a
civilization is considered to be ‘other’ it is only a matter of time, style and degree before they
will be stripped of their rights or even existence^ (Dehzani 2008, p. 20).
Nationalism’s Othering processes and its underpinning technologies of Othering are
inherently gendered. The feminist literature has already demonstrated how the Othering
process relies on the gender relations of patriarchy and reproduces such relations (see,
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e.g., Beukian 2014; Peterson 2007; Yuval-Davis 1997; Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler
2002).10 These studies share McClintock’s (1993, p. 61) view and criticism that although
Bthe invented nature of nationalism has found wide theoretical currency, explorations of
the gendering of the national imaginary have been conspicuously paltry.^
As an attempt to summarise this vast literature, it could be said that the feminist critique
has demonstrated the gendered division of labour in the imagining of the nation, highlight-
ing, for example, the specific roles ascribed to women by the nationalist project (Iveković
and Mostov 2002; Peterson 2007; Yuval-Davis 1997). Women are not only the biological
reproducers of the nation but are also in charge of cultural reproduction. Women often
perform the role of the Bsymbolic bearers of the collectivity’s identity and honour, both
personally and collectively^ (Yuval-Davis 1997, p. 45). Due to women’s Bburden of
representation^ it has been in the national(istic) project’s interest to control not onlywomen’s
behaviour, but also their body and sexuality; a role ascribed to the male bodies of the nation.
Within the patriarchal family, the gendered division of labour follows a pattern in which
women are perceived as the passive bearers of the family/national honour, and men are the
active defenders of their women’s and nation’s honour (Nagel 1998).
This article adds to this scholarship by considering how the gendered nature of
nationalism operates not only through the patriarchal relations between men and
women, but also draws from the (internal) Othering processes of hegemonic mascu-
linity that regulate and maintain the hierarchical relations among men and
masculinities.11 This argument is presented in two steps. First, the article explores the
relational structure of hegemonic masculinity, followed by a reconceptualising of
nationalism as competing masculinities.
Masculinities: homophobia and other marginalised positions
Critical masculinity studies have long argued that masculinity should be conceptualised
as a Bsocial position, a set of practices, and the effect of the collective embodiment of
those practices on individuals, relationships, institutional structures, and global rela-
tions of domination^ (Schippers 2007, pp. 86–87). It is Bproduced, contested, and
transformed through discursive processes, and therefore embedded within and produc-
tive of power relations^ (p. 94).12 In other words, as a configuration of practice,
10 The feminist literature on nationalism is vast and has different traditions. For example, some feminist
critiques of the Bmainstream^ theorisation of nationalism has focused on uncovering women’s involvement in
nationalist movements (see, e.g., Alison 2004; Bunster 1988; Vickers and Vouloukos 2007), whilst others have
shown that feminism and nationalism are not mutually exclusive (Cockburn 2000; Jayawardena 1986), albeit
that women might have a different Bnational project^ (Walby 1992).
11 Although one can also analyse how nationalism affects the social practices of men and how nationalism
shapes the category of men, this article is interested in how nationalism relies on the power structures that
govern masculinities, social expectations, and gender norms that govern how men are expected to act.
12 Whilst masculinities relate to a social position, a set of practices and the collective embodiment of these
practices, it is important to note that this is different from the category of men and their social behaviours.
Whilst it is true that most men embody a form of masculinity, not all men do. Additionally, the performativity
and embodiment of masculinity is not exclusively a male endeavour as women can also perform and embody
masculinity. In this article, the relational aspect of masculinity is emphasised and the power structures that
govern masculinities are at the forefront. As such, although the article might refer to power structures among
men to highlight these issues, the reader should keep in mind that such statement relates to the social position
of masculinity and not the social practices of the category of men (albeit that they are closely related).
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masculinity is inherently relational,13 which does not exist without its contrast femi-
ninity (Connell 2005, p. 68). However, the relational character of masculinity does not
end there. As Connell (2005) argues, it has become common to recognise multiple
forms of masculinities, which relate to each other in distinct ways. Hence, masculinity
is not just a configuration of power relations between the constructed categories of men
and women, but also between men.
To understand and theorise these gendered power relations, Connell (2005) intro-
duced the concept of hegemonic masculinity.14 Hegemonic masculinity is the
Bmasculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender
relations^ (p.76), and is defined as Bthe configuration of gender practice which
embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy,
which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the
subordination of women^ (p. 77). Hegemonic masculinity, which can be seen as the
lived expectations of masculinity, has to be distinguished from men’s lived experiences
of their own masculinities, which are always multiple (Dolan 2002). At this point, it is
important to note that Bhegemonic masculinity [is] not assumed to be normal in the
statistical sense; only a minority of men might enact it^ (Connell and Messerschmidt
2005, p. 832). Instead, hegemonic masculinity is normative. It is a prescriptive notion
that occupies a structural position of power and embodies the currently most respected/
honoured way of what it means to be a man.
Despite such relational formulation, there is a common slippage in the literatures
using the concept between the use of hegemonic masculinity as power structure—a
concept referring to the most dominant ideational version of masculinity—and as a
(substantialist) empirical reference to an actual group of men (often those in power)
(Beasley 2013). I consider the later interpretation of hegemonic masculinity, which is
commonly used in nationalism studies, problematic. Hegemonic masculinity instead
should be studied within its relational structure, i.e., as a Bpolitical ideal or model, as an
enabling mode or representation, which mobilises institutions and practices^ (Beasley
2013, pp. 36, emphasis in original). Indeed, one of the greatest contributions of
Connell’s concept lies in the conceptualisation of the internal hierarchy. It recognises
that not all men benefit equally from patriarchy, and it acknowledges differences,
inequalities, and hierarchies among masculinities (Connell 2005). The difference
between hegemonic masculinity and other masculinities does not relate to their control
of women, but rather to the fact that hegemonic masculinity also entails control of men
(Donaldson 1993).
Although hegemonic masculinity is located at the top of the hierarchy, it is
fraught with instability and change and exists in a tense, potentially unstable
relationship with other masculinities (Tosh 2004). To obtain and maintain
13 Masculinity/−ies is a relational concept in two distinct ways. First, it comes into existence via social
relations, via its performance. Second, it is defined in relation to other things, such as femininity and other
masculinities.
14 Although the term was already floating around in scholarly debates in the 1980s, it became a mainstream
notion with Connell’s (1995) seminal work Masculinities. The concept has been criticised (see, e.g., Beasley
2008; Christensen and Jensen 2014) and reformulated (see, e.g., Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; but also
Schippers 2007), yet its basic ideas have been widely accepted and it is now commonly used in masculinities
(gender) studies (for an overview of the use of the concept of hegemonic masculinity in scholarly debates, see
Messerschmidt 2012).
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legitimacy and symbolic power, hegemonic masculinity needs to present and
define itself in opposition to other masculinities (Christensen and Jensen 2014).
Connell (1995, 2005) highlights two types of Othering processes that help to
maintain hegemonic masculinity, i.e., the juxtaposition with subordinate and
marginalised masculinities.
Subordinate masculinities are those at the bottom of the hierarchy. Although there
are multiple subordinate masculinities, the most important one in most heteronormative
societies (and particularly contemporary European and American) societies is
Bhomosexual masculinity^ (Connell 2005).15 The subordination is more than a mere
stigmatisation of gay identities, and it consists of an array of practices, including
political and cultural exclusion, cultural abuse, legal and street violence, and discrim-
ination. Via the process of Othering, homosexual masculinity, Bin patriarchal ideology,
[becomes] the repository of whatever is symbolically expelled from hegemonic
masculinity^ (Connell 2005, p. 78).
The hegemonic-subordinate relationship becomes more important and more pro-
nounced when considering how men aspire to masculine ideals. Following the fact that
cultural ideals of hegemonic masculinity are virtually unobtainable for men (it is an
uninhabitable goal for themajority of men), there is a constant need for men to prove their
success in achieving these ideals (Alsop et al. 2002). Hence, masculinity is in a constant
state of insecurity, and, as a relational process, is in constant need of reaffirmation. Men
have to Bperform^ their masculinity for other men, who will evaluate and approve one’s
manhood (Alsop et al. 2002). It is, as Kimmel (1994, p.129, original emphasis) argues, a
Bhomosocial enactment […] fraught with danger, with the risk of failure, and with intense
relentless competition.^ He continues that, within this competition,
homophobia is a central organizing principle of our cultural definition of man-
hood. [it] is more than the irrational fear of gay men, more than the fear that we
might be perceived as gay. […] Homophobia is the fear that other men will
unmask us, emasculate us, reveal to us and the world that we do not measure up,
that we are not real men. (p. 131)
Homophobia, in this regard, should not just be conceptualised as an individual bias
towards homosexuals, but rather as a technology of Othering that plays a crucial, if not
fundamental, role in reinforcing hegemonic masculinity and in patrolling Ba key male
intragender divide between ‘real men’ and ‘others’^ (Plummer 2001, p. 69, see also
Kimmel 1994; Pascoe 2007). The use of homophobia does not only create the
emasculated Other but also constitute an act of self-production (Nayak and Kehily
1996). In other words, by performing or displaying homophobia—and thus rejecting
what is non-masculine—men can consolidate their own hegemonic masculinity. In
short, it can be argued that homophobia is a masculine technology of Othering,16 in
which some men are reduced to an object/abject used for self-valorisation and that can
15 Although the position of subordinate masculinity is itself a relational field with a multiplicity of
masculinities all part of a hierarchy within, the process of Othering stereotypes and homogenises these
masculinities into one position against which hegemonic masculinity defines itself.
16 The notion of Bmasculine^ here is used to highlight the embeddedness of this technology of Othering in the
hegemonic matrix and processes that underpin hegemonic masculinity. It should not be taken to mean it is a
practice done by men or that it is associated with a version of masculinity.
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be (violently) cast aside. It is a practice that is de-coupled from sexuality, i.e., it does not
need to be exercised against homosexual bodies, nor does it need to be explicitly based
on sexual language. Homophobia as a technology of Othering functions by denying the
masculinity of the Other—through projecting despised non-masculine aspects onto the
Other—in order to emphasise the masculinity of the Self.
Whilst these studies on Bmasculinity as homophobia^ are situated at the micro-
level, these processes are embedded in a macro structure. In an attempt to under-
stand the changing nature and usage of homophobia, Plummer (2014) advances his
gender taboo theory. In this theory, homophobia, as an expression of a complex
system of masculine taboos, plays a crucial role in defining and enforcing gender
taboos and well as in policing and punishing gender transgressions. It proposes
three patterns and usages of homophobia, which are determined by a culture’s
receptiveness to transformations in gender relations and how they respond to gender
transgressions. These patterns are: 1) Rejection: a refusal to accommodate gender
role change and harsh responses to gender transgression; 2) Reaction: a reactionary
response to change accompanied by a retreat to more secure fundamental versions
of masculinity; and 3) Accommodation: gender role change is accommodated,
which is more likely in social settings with flexible masculinities (Plummer 2014,
p. 134). In other words, the power of homophobia as a technology of Othering is
dependent on the surrounding context and culture, as well as—as I argue below—
the national imagination.
The second major process of Othering within masculinities can be found in the
relationship between hegemonic masculinity and marginalised masculinities (Connell
2005). Marginalised masculinity comes forth from the intersectionality among gender,
race, class, and other social structures, and Brefers to the relations between the
masculinities in dominant and subordinated classes or racial groups. Marginalization
is always relative to the authorization of the hegemonic masculinity of the dominant
group^ (pp. 80–81). Although the validity of their masculinity is denied, marginalised
masculinities are still considered masculine, albeit inferior to hegemonic masculinity.
This middle-ground structural position of marginalised masculinities plays an important
role in constructing the dominant gender hierarchies: by depicting the marginalised
masculinity as a masculinity of lesser value, hegemonic masculinity gains its position
as the one and only proper masculinity (Connell 2005).
To summarise, hegemonic masculinity gains its meaning through processes embed-
ded in the logic of contrast and the logic of contradiction (Christensen and Jensen
2014; Hutchings 2008). The former maintains the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate masculinities—higher versus lower, normal versus deviant, or hegemonic
versus marginalised—and gives hegemonic masculinity flexibility and malleability that
allows for change without losing its sense of continuity. Through the logic of contra-
diction, often relying on homophobia as a technology of Othering, the distinction
between the masculine and the not-masculine is created and maintained (hegemonic
masculinity vs. subordinate masculinities).
In the following section, I demonstrate how nationalist Othering relies on these
masculine Othering processes and technologies of Othering in the imagining of the
nation. I argue that the link between masculinities and nationalism is not found in their
overlapping substantive ideals, but rather that the two phenomena are co-constructed
through their overlapping Othering processes.
Theory and Society
Nationalism as competing masculinities
This section analyses different manifestations of nationalism over time and across
different contexts in order to highlight how nationalism has deployed ideals of hege-
monic masculinity and its technologies of Othering to promote the nationalist project.
Several studies have explored the link between nationalism and hegemonic
masculinities (see, e.g., Ashe 2012; Banerjee 2003; Bracewell 2000; Hansen 1996;
Massad 1995). They all have shown how nationalist mobilisation employs/constructs
hegemonic masculinity to define the nation. Nationalists, it is argued, have been
manipulating the hegemonic masculine model to serve their goals by linking it to other
key markers of identity such as ethnicity and race (Dolan 2002). Based on an analysis
of these studies, one can discern three distinct ways in which nationalism builds on
masculine Othering processes. Two of these rely on homophobia as a technology of
Othering. Here, the national masculine self is constructed by denying the masculinity of
other nations or internal Others. The third overlap is based on the use of the logic of
contrast to reaffirm the nation’s position at the top of the hierarchy by positioning other
nations as barbaric and less than.
Before discussing these processes in more detail, it bears repeating that the focus is
not to trace the historical co-construction and evolution of the relation between
nationalism and masculinity in terms of their substantive overlap. Instead, the examples
presented here are used to illustrate the different ways in which masculine technologies
of Othering are employed to (re)produce the symbolic boundaries of the nation.
Additionally, the reader should bear in mind that these processes are to be situated
within their socio-political and temporal context. This means that the examples and the
specific ways through which the national Other is imagined are subject to change. The
possibility of change reflects the flexibility and malleability of the national boundaries
(despite their representation as inherently fixed by nationalist actors). Finally, the
described processes relate to the specific position of the Other vis-à-vis the national
Self. The identified masculine Othering processes and technologies of Othering,
therefore, are to be located within the Other-Self relation rather than being a charac-
teristic of nationalism itself, and thus they can co-exist.
The first way in which masculine technologies of Othering are used relates to
external boundary creation. It captures the usage of homophobia (as a technology of
Othering) to distinguish the national Self from external enemies and threats to the
nation. These external Others can be located in the (imagined) past of the nation as a
resistance to how the nation was Othered by other nationalist movements, or they can
relate to other nations who are positioned at the bottom of the hierarchy through
homophobia as a technology of Othering. As a reminder, homophobia as a technology
of Othering does not need to be directed to homosexual bodies or use explicit
homophobic language, but it ultimately relies on the fear of being associated with the
non-masculine. As such, the projection of undesired non-masculine (often effeminate)
traits onto the Other is used to reinforce the national Self’s masculinity.
The former is well illustrated in the Mayer’s (2000a) study on (twentieth-century)
Jewish nationalism, in which she argues that the constant (real or imagined) threat of
annihilation over the course of the twentieth century has led Jewish nationalists to
imagine the Israeli nation through the notion of the New Jew, the Muscle Jew, which
relies on a heavily militarised form of masculinity. This national ideal was constructed
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in opposition to the Other, the Ghetto Jew, which is seen as the Bstooped, intellectual
and victimized diaspora predecessor [associated] with characteristics deemed negative-
ly feminine such as being passive or vulnerable victims^ (Katz 1996, p. 87). In other
words, the Ghetto Jew is excluded from the nation by means of its subordinate
masculine form of Jewishness. Ironically, the use of homophobia as a technology of
Othering to deny (and subordinate) the masculinity of the Ghetto Jew is in many ways
the result of the internalisation of the prevailing anti-semitic views of other nations that
described Jews as passive and feminine (see Mayer 2000a, but also Mosse 1985). This
clearly demonstrates the relational aspect of both nationalism and masculinities.
Whereas European nation-states in the nineteenth and early twentieth century relied
on technologies of Othering akin to the way in which hegemonic masculinity estab-
lishes itself through homophobia—Jews were depicted as lacking all manliness and
Bsaid to exhibit female traits, just as homosexuals were generally considered
effeminate^ (Mosse 1985, p. 36)17—the Zionist reaction to this Othering was to re-
establish its masculinity by drawing on mythologised, masculinist stories about Jews’
past struggles to survive in the face of numerical inferiority (Mayer 2000a).
Emphasising the courage of Jewish men that enabled past victories, these myths have
shaped Jewish nationalism so that Zionism and the imagining of the nation is per-
formed through the hegemonic masculine ideal of the Muscle Jew and the exclusion of
the (metaphorically homosexualised) Ghetto Jew.
Hindutva nationalism followed a similar trend. Hansen (1996, p. 138), for example,
argued that the Brecuperation of masculinity is a common theme in Hindu nationalist
discourses.^ He identified that this overcoming of the emasculation (by the British
colonisers) was at the heart of the Hindutva national project (see also Banerjee 2003,
2005). As suggested by Said (1978) and Inden (1990), the British Empire in part
justified the colonisation of India by arguing that the Indian men were effeminate, a
status that was further cemented by the fact they were conquered (see also Banerjee
2003). Hindutva anti-colonial nationalism sought to reclaim their (by the colonial
powers) denied masculinity, thereby Othering the past colonised and effeminate Self.
Whereas these examples have highlighted the imagined past-Self as the object of
homophobia as a technology of Othering, this does not always need to be the case.
Other nations too can be positioned as non-masculine through similar processes.
Indeed, the previous discussion of how Jews where depicted in European nationalisms
and the gendered nature of Orientalism already alluded to this point. A more recent
example can be found in the contemporary Russian nationalism, which has been
characterised as a Bremasculinisation of the nation^ (Riabov and Riabova 2014). This
remasculinisation is achieved through the promotion of (hyper)masculine notion of the
nation whilst simultaneously demasculinising its Others. A case in point is the wide-
spread trope of BGayropa,^ which seeks to emphasise the Western perversion of
accepting homosexuality as a lifestyle, and mobilises it as a Bdistinctive feature of
Western Europe’s demasculinization^ (Riabov and Riabova 2014, p. 29).
The second process through which nationalism relies on homophobia as a technol-
ogy of Othering relates to the construction and maintenance of internal boundaries.
17 It is important to note here that Jews, according to Mosse (1985), were seldom accused to be homosexual
themselves, but the positioning of Jews as inferior relied on effeminisation strategies and stereotypes that were
closely associated with the homosexual national Other (cf. homophobia as technology of Othering).
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Unlike with the construction of external boundaries, homophobia as a technology of
Othering in this scenario is often explicitly linked to notions of homosexuality. Here,
nationalists other those bodies within the nation that resist the national project by using
homophobic tropes to undermine political legitimacy.
A case in point is Afrikaner nationalism and the ways in which it stigmatised those
objecting to conscription in Apartheid South-Africa (see Conway 2008, 2012). Con-
scription in Apartheid South Africa has been described as a constitutive performance of
masculinity and citizenship for white South Africans (Conway 2008). For the South
African state, however, it was also a tool to moderate the intra-white social and political
cleavages, forging a new white South African identity based upon the notion of a
heroic, virile, and strong masculinity. Objectors to military service, as strangers (see
Bauman 1991, p. 54)18—neither insiders nor outsiders of the nation—posed a partic-
ular threat to the state as they not only Bundermined the normative foundations of the
state [but also] contested the accepted gender norms that white men were expected to
follow in South Africa^ (Conway 2008, p. 425). Although the state’s reaction to
objectors to military service was multiple, its use of homophobic stigmatisation seemed
to be the most successful. This particular strategy drew from the hegemonic white
South-African masculinity and subordinated the Bobjectors’ masculinity by the charge
of cowardice and the innuendo of homosexuality [which] actually stigmatised objectors
and destabilized their right to political agency within the public realm^ (Conway 2008,
p. 434).19 In short, in Apartheid South Africa, the objectors to military service
threatened the gendered binary of political and social life. In its response, the state
sought to reinforce the hegemony of its nationalist project through the homophobia as a
technology of Othering, stigmatising objectors’ personal identities (irrespective of
whether they are gay or not) and questioning their national belonging and existence
as political actors (Conway 2008).
A similar process can be noted in Serbia. During the 1990s wars, those resisting the
nationalist project were labelled as Btraitors of their nation [and] traitors to their gender:
cowardly, weak, effeminate and probably homosexual^ (Bracewell 2000, p. 580,
emphasis added). More recently, Serbian nationalists have relied on homophobia as a
technology of Othering to discredit those who they perceive to be national traitors. As a
case in point, consider the recent objection to Prime Minister Vucic (now President) by
nationalist movements, particularly following his softened stance towards the Belgrade
Pride in 2014. These objections reached a new high after an incident in which a high-
profile football match between Serbia and Albania was interrupted by a drone carrying
a flag depicting a map of Greater Albania (which includes Kosovo20). When this
happened, the stadium erupted in the chant BVučiću, pederu, izdao si Srbiju^ [Vucic,
you faggot, you’ve betrayed Serbia], referring to Vucic allowing Belgrade Pride but
also his signing of the Brussels Agreement between Belgrade and Pristina (Igrutinović
2015). To this data, the trope remains a popular method for nationalists to undermine
Vucic’s policies. For example, in 2015, the nationalist organisations had organised a
protest called VCC PDR (reads as Vucic peder [Vucic faggot]) in front of Vucic’s party
18 I use the word Bstranger^ to keep true to Conway’s (2008) analysis.
19 It is important to note though that whilst the state used homophobia against objectors and white dissidents,
gay men were simultaneously allowed to serve as conscripts (Conway 2012).
20 Kosovo has an important place in Serbian nationalist mythology (see Slootmaeckers 2017).
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headquarters to protests against the Belgrade Pride, which was deemed to be a betrayal
of and an attack on the Serbian nation and its system of values (Slootmaeckers 2017).
Here, it is important to note that the maintenance of internal boundaries through the
use of homophobia as a technology of Othering does not only exclude internal Others
by discrediting them. It can also explicitly target homosexuals as a social group, who
are depicted as a threat to the (biological) reproduction of nation (as is argued in the
existing literature on homophobia and nationalism, see e.g. Mole 2011, 2016). The
Bpink triangle^ homosexuals were forced to wear in Nazi Germany and the Nazi-
occupied territories is only but one example of this. Not only were homosexual men
singled out as the national outsiders because they did not confirm to the Aryan
hegemonic masculinity, but they were also stigmatised because they did not contribute
to the reproduction of the nation (Boden 2011). With its emphasis on reproducing the
race (nation or ethnicity), Nazism (and fascism more generally) persecuted homosex-
uals on the basis that they Bthreatened the ascendancy of German culture. Since
homoerotic intimacy did not serve a reproductive purpose, homosexuals were, by
definition, incapable of propagating the Volk. Unable to fulfil the social duties pre-
scribed by their gender, homosexuals were vilified as social pariahs^ (Boden 2011, p.
1). Such rhetoric is still employed by nationalist movements—often supported by
Churches—who define the nation via their statements on homosexuality; arguing that
homosexuality is a threat to the biological survival of the nation (See, e.g., Mole 2011;
Pavasovic Trost and Slootmaeckers 2015).21
The final process of national boundary construction uses the masculine Othering
based on the logic of contrast. Here, nationalism confirms the superiority of the nation
by comparing it to other nations, which are deemed to be masculine yet inferior in their
expressions of masculinity.22 The previously discussed Hindutva nationalism is a good
example, as it did not only position the Hindu nation vis-à-vis the past-Self, but also
against the Muslim Other. Here, the nationalist project defined Hindutva masculinity as
Bpatriotic selfless individuals […], loyal to the nation and the RSS [one of the
nationalist organisations], physically well trained, ‘manly’ and courageous, self-
disciplined and capable of organization^ (Hansen 1996, p. 147), and contrasted it to
the Ballegedly strong, aggressive, militarised, potent and masculine Muslim^ (p. 148).
Thus, in Hindutva nationalism, the image of the nation is created on the back of the
figure of the Muslim and Muslim nationhood more broadly. The figure of the Muslim is
othered at least partially based upon its imagined masculinity. The Muslim Other is
deemed a marginalised masculinity in relation to the hegemonic Hindutva masculinity,
which in turn reconfirming the dominance of the Hindu nation (see also Anand 2007).
By the same token, Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s projected a
hegemonic masculine ideal as an inspirational image symbolising the nation, aimed
at merging different perceptions of masculinities into a single hegemonic one in
order to achieve the desired Bvolkseenheid^ (national unity) (du Pisani 2004). They
did so by contrasting Afrikaner masculinity to other, Black and English,
masculinities in order to make Afrikaner men aware of their sameness (Conway
21 Here, one can also consider the recent persecution of homosexuals in Chechnya.
22 Just as the Othering process between hegemonic masculinity and marginalised masculinity is rooted within
the intersectionality of gender, race, class, and other social structures, the Othering process described here
should also be situated within such intersectionality. However, a detailed analysis of how these intersecting
social structures play a role in nationalist Othering is beyond the scope of this article.
Theory and Society
2008; du Pisani 2004). The English, for example, where othered through references
to the Anglo-Boer war, which the Afrikaners had lost not in a courageous battle but
because the British has used Bmethods of barbarism^ (du Pisani 2004, pp.161–165).
The Black population of South Africa was also othered as inferior by depicting
them as Bdirty, contaminated by disease, ugly, dim-witted, lazy, brutal, etc. The
black man was regarded as primitive, uncivilised, immature [… and] the antithesis
of the Afrikaner ideal of masculinity^ (p. 166).
Similar mechanisms could be observed in the portrayal of Syrian male refugees in
Europe during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. If not depicted as non-masculine
cowards (the first mechanism discussed), they were depicted as rapists and/or terrorists
(Rettberg and Gajjala 2015). In other words, these refugees were threats to the
European nations and were configured as sexually predatory and undisciplined aggres-
sive men that do not belong in Europe.
The above discussion can be summarised as follows: when imagining the nation,
positive masculine images of the Self are matched by negative images of the Other,
both internal and external. The Other is dehumanised or demasculinised through
homophobia as a technology of Othering, or represented as a derided or feared
masculine Other (see also Horne 2004).
By linking hegemonic masculinity to the imagined community that is the nation,
nationalism does not only succeed in creating a representation of itself in relation to the
BOther,^ but it also achieves the embodiment of the nation in its masculine subjects.
The latter is especially true in times of crisis. In periods of resistance or intense nation
building, hegemonic masculinity is used in a highly idealised form as a metaphor for
the political community as a whole (Tosh 2004, p. 49; see also Väyrynen 2013). This is
to say that Bmasculine individuals embod[y] nationality^ (Sluga 1998, pp. 104, original
emphasis). As men’s identity is so intertwined with that of the nation, it easily translates
into what Hroch (1996, p. 90) calls, a Bpersonalized image of the nation.^
The embodiment of the nation by men becomes particularly clear during epi-
sodes of armed conflict. In wartime, the previously discussed masculine technolo-
gies of Othering are used in extreme forms to assert the nation’s dominance in the
conflict. A point in case is the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, which can
be considered to be the embodied expression of the previously discussed technol-
ogies of Othering. Indeed, Väyrynen (2013, p. 139) has argued that Bwar can be
seen to be one of the most totalizing events where a large-scale appropriation of
human bodies takes place and where the scripts of nationalism are violently written
on human flesh,^ and wartime sexual violence is one of the most violent forms of
such bodily appropriation. Despite being much less theorised, nationalist conflicts
are also fought over male bodies.23
As masculine individuals embody nationality, sexual violence during wartime,
although disproportionally affecting women, is also targeted at men (see also Féron
2018). As such, sexual violence (whether against men or women) can also be
conceptualised as a violent and embodied expression of masculine Technologies of
23 Feminist scholarship on nationalism already highlighted that women’s bodies represent the symbolic
boundaries of the nation and the rape of women in war then is considered to be an act of conquest, occupying
enemy territory. The female body, in this regard, has often been labelled as the battlefield of masculine/
nationalist conflicts (Krog 2001).
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Othering, aimed at producing and reinforcing the nation’s (masculine) dominance over
the enemy (see also Vojdik 2014, pp. 944–945). Although unpacking such conceptu-
alisation in detail requires another full-length article, I want to demonstrate briefly how
sexual violence in wartime acts as a way to mark the boundaries between nations by
reaffirming hierarchies amongst nations in masculine terms.
First, by raping BTheir^ women a message is sent to the Other’s men that they
cannot protect their women, that they are not masculine enough, whilst at the same time
establishing the masculine dominance of nation’s Self and its men. Similarly, sexual
violence against men is also about male domination; it symbolises the masculinity of
the perpetrator as powerful and dominant, whilst at the same time emasculating the
victim, presenting it as stereotypical feminine, weak, and powerless (Sivakumaran
2007, 2010; Vojdik 2014). The rape of the male body is a direct act that is aimed at
communicating something about the victims’masculine identity (Christian et al. 2012),
and in extension the Other’s nationhood (for a critical discussion on this, see also
Eichert 2018). Sexual violence against men, then, is an act to display power and
dominance that subordinates other men/nations (Solangon and Patel 2012). The perpe-
trator exerts his masculine dominance by either penetrating the victim, sexual torture, or
by forcing him to rape other men (or family members). The victim, on the other hand, is
positioned as non-masculine, unable to defend himself (or his family), and as homo-
sexual.24 The latter is particular the case when the victim experiences an erection or
ejaculate, not uncommon in the context of male rape, as this raises doubts about his
sexuality and masculinity (Sivakumaran 2007, p. 272; see also Solangon and Patel
2012). Thus, the act of male rape is an extreme, violent, and embodied expression
homophobia as a technology of Othering. Sexual violence during wartime, thus, is a
transaction of the masculine identities of the perpetrator and victims (Skjelsbæk 2001);
the masculinity lost by the victim is gained by the perpetrator. Furthermore, because
men embody the nation (Zarkov and Cockburn 2002), this exchange of masculinity
becomes an ethnic/national transaction. Zarkov (2001, p. 78) for example, argued that
the castration [and rape (see Jones 2006)] of a single man of the ethnically
defined enemy is symbolic appropriation of the masculinity of the whole group.
Sexual humiliation of a man from another ethnicity is, thus, a proof of not only
that he is a lesser man, but also that his ethnicity is a lesser ethnicity. Emascu-
lation [via sexual violence] annihilated the power of the ethnic Other by annihi-
lating the power of its men’s masculinity.
The use of sexual violence against men as a masculine technology of Othering also
occurs at the discursive level. Consider, for example, Zarkov’s (2007) analysis of media
representations in the Croatian and Serbian press of sexual violence against men. She
argues that the different representation of the male body in stories about sexual violence
against men contributed to the construction of the ethnic Self and Other. Although
stories about male victims of sexual violence were rare, she contends that the selected
24 It is important to note that such re-positioning does not necessarily relate to the individual identity or
experiences of the victim, but rather should be considered within an audience-focused framework (see
Eichert 2018). Through the acts of sexual violence against men, perpetrators send messages to different
sets of audiences.
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presence of some male bodies is significant. Within the Croatian press, for example,
male victims were (made) invisible. This invisibility, Zarkov (2001, p. 80) continues,
Bpoints to the significance of positioning a heterosexual power at the core of the
definition of the ethnic Self in the Croatian media. The raped or the castrated Croat
man […] would undermine the construction of the Croat nation as virile and powerful.^
Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), on the other hand, were always depicted as the victims,
and both their masculinity and heterosexuality were systematically questioned. Serbs,
in the Croatian reports on sexual violence against men, were always depicted as the
perpetrators. Although their masculinity was not brought into question (as perpetrators,
their acts are interpreted in terms of power), it was defined as significantly different
from Croat masculinity. Serbs were depicted as Bperverts^ and primitives. Images of
masculinity were thus used to signify the boundaries between the different nations. The
de-masculinisation and homosexualisation of Bosniaks in the media representation
points to the usage of homophobia as a technology of Othering to exclude them from
the Croatian nation, whilst Serbs were excluded because their masculinity was pervert-
ed and primitive, and thus lesser than the powerful, heterosexual masculinity of the
Croat men/nation (othered as a marginalised masculinity).
Based on the above discussions, it becomes clear that nationalism and hegemonic
masculinity are co-constructive hegemonic processes in which the (national) Other is
defined along the lines of effeminate (i.e., subordinated), or defect/barbaric (i.e.,
marginalised) masculinities. Homophobia as a technology of Othering plays an impor-
tant role within this process, but it is not the only technology available. For example,
internal objectors are labelled as homosexual—i.e., their masculinity, and therefore
their legitimacy has been denied—and outsiders can be presented as effeminate and
lacking masculinity. Yet, the Other can also be represented as barbaric, i.e., through the
lens of marginalised masculinities.
I use the notion of nationalism as competing masculinities to think about this process
in more abstract terms. Competing in the sense that nationalism and nationalist conflict
are inherently embedded in a field defined by Bpolitics of social ordering and the
creation of hierarchies^ (Serrano-Amaya 2018, p. 106), a hegemonic and relational
structure in which each nation will seek to claim superiority or dominance over the other.
The notion of competing masculinities then is used to emphasise the relational nature of
the described processes and to capture how nations seek to position themselves at the top
of their own hierarchical imagining by using different masculine technologies of
Othering. How this is done is often a reaction to how the nation is positioned and
imagined in the Othering processes of different nations. Put differently, the imagining of
the nation through masculine processes is transactional and happens in relation the
existing Othering processes within its relational field. As such, technologies of Othering
are always located within specific Self/Other relations, whilst their usage can also be
influenced by the way in which the nation is othered by others within the field.
Whereas the above has highlighted how homophobia, as a technology of Othering,
is used to exclude the homosexual/non-masculine from the nation. It is important to
note that the relationship between nationalism and homophobia is not so straightfor-
ward. For example, consider the recent phenomenon in which (some) homosexual
bodies are included within the nation and a nation’s status is judged based on their
homo-friendliness (see Puar 2007). Because masculine technologies of Othering do not
just rely on subordination but also on marginalisation, the conceptualisation of
Theory and Society
nationalism as competing masculinities provides a theoretical tool that can also capture
these new dynamics. Indeed, as discussed in more detail below, homonationalism
employs masculine technologies of Othering following the logic of contrast to empha-
sise the superior position of the nation vis-à-vis its Others.
The masculine othering processes of homonationalism
Homonationalism and heteronationalism are often discussed as two contradictory
phenomena. In this section, I question such conceptualisation and argue that these
two phenomena might actually follow similar dynamics of competing masculinities.
Both rely on discourses centered on homosexuality, albeit with homophobia (as a
technology of Othering) being located in different types of Self/Other relations.
With the globalisation of the LGBT rights movement and with the expanding legal
changes to protect these minorities from discrimination in a number of states, a new
trend is emerging in which Bgay tolerance^ becomes inscribed in the national identity
(Kahlina 2015, p. 74). This shift to the protection of sexual minorities within the nation
has been conceptualised by Puar (2007, 2013) as homonationalism, which she describes
as Ba facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some)
homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and funda-
mental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality^
(Puar 2013, p. 337). Within this context, nations are increasingly defined by either their
gay-friendliness or homophobia. In other words, Bthe proclaimed tolerance towards
sexual minorities is incorporated in the national imaginary as a marker of alleged
progressiveness, tolerance, and modernity, creating in this way a spatial and temporal
boundary which places the ‘homophobic others’ on the historical path of progress
towards Western-style ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernity’^ (Kahlina 2015, p. 74). In
(Western) Europe, homonationalist discourses have been used to mark the difference
between the progressive, homo-tolerant Self and the homophobic immigrant Other (see,
e.g., Bracke 2012; Fassin 2010; Mepschen et al. 2010).
Whilst the previous discussion has shown that homophobia can be used to construct
a nation’s identity vis-à-vis its Others and to establish its superiority, I argue that
masculine Othering processes also guide these homonationalist practices. The
difference is that the masculine ideal that occupies the hegemonic position has
shifted. Revisiting the earlier discussed gender taboo theory of Plummer (2014) it
can be argued that the increased visibility of the LGBT movement in Western countries
and the shifts in societal attitudes towards homosexuality has contributed to the decline
in homophobia as a masculine technology of Othering. Indeed, exemplifying a re-
sponse of accommodation to shifting gender relations, hegemonic masculinities have
come to define themselves in more inclusive or hybrid terms (see, e.g., Anderson
2005).25 Whilst this empirical observation suggests that there has been a decline in the
25 It is important to note here that I do not wish to subscribe to the so-called inclusive masculinity theory
postulated by Anderson (2010) and McCormack (2012) as this theory does not consider the relational nature
and power dynamics of masculinity construction. Rather, theoretically, I am inclined to follow the work of
Bridges and Pascoe (2016), who have argued the performance of hegemonic masculinity can shift to include
softer version of masculinities, which are located in a post-homophobic era, wherein homophobia is both the
bedrock of the construction of masculinities and in decline (Bridges and Pascoe 2016).
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usage of homophobic language to other different masculinities, the tolerance for
homosexuals remains arguably superficial. First, whilst some have argued that homo-
phobic jokes are no longer means to discriminate and insult subordinate masculinities
(see, e.g., McCormack 2012), others have shown that such fag discourse, as a way of
teasing, is still used to police masculinities (see, e.g., Pascoe 2007). Second, the
inclusion of homosexuals should be understood as homonormative, where those who
assimilate within heteronormative structures are tolerated (see Puar 2007; but also
Duggan 2003). Third, and this is key for the argument made here, is that the inclusion
of homosexuals within the imagining of the nation is made possible on the back of the
(racialised) Othering process of other non-western cultures. The ultimate homophobic
Other is then represented as one of an orthodox, hetero-patriarchal masculinity which is
sexually backwards and repressive to both homosexuals and women and is therefore
positioned as less than the western new modes of inclusive/hybrid masculinities (Jungar
and Peltonen 2015).
When discussing homonationalism, it is important to note that the inclusion of
homosexual bodies within the nation does not mean that the heteronormative under-
pinnings of nationalism are being cast away. On the contrary, it can be argued that the
national tolerance for homosexuality supports the underlying heteronormativity. To
make this case, one has to take note of two particular characteristics of
heteronormativity: its capacity to include homosexuality and its difference from
homonegativity.26 First, although heteronormativity allows us to assume that every-
body is straight, it also provides guidance for dealing with those situations in which this
assumption does not hold (Chambers 2007). Non-straight people are required either to
pretend they are straight (keeping the assumption intact) or to Bcome out^ as homo-
sexual (and thus explicitly declare their deviance from the norm). This is to say, by
coming out, the homosexual becomes the Bstranger,^ culturally excluded and con-
structed as the being Boutside the ‘normal’ divisions and categories^ (Bauman 1991, p.
66) yet tolerated within the framework of homonationalism. That is as long as they do
not challenge the heteronormative system (see Duggan 2003).
Second, heteronormativity is distinct from homonegativity (i.e., Bhomophobia^ as
an attitude) (Chambers 2007). Contrary to heteronormativity that designates both the
political power and social structuring effects of heterosexuality as a norm,
homonegativity suggests a reduction to the individual. BUsed as a political concept,
homophobia [here referred to as attitudes] encourages an interpretation that would
reduce the political effects of heteronormativity […] to the explicit actions of a few
homophobic individuals^ (Chambers 2007, p. 664). Taking homophobia (as attitudes),
rather than heteronormativity, as a political problem within the nation, it is implied that
the solution can be found in changing individuals’ attitudes. Consequently, any instance
of homophobic/homonegative behaviour by a member of the nation within a
homonationalism is reduced to an individualised problem—non-symptomatic for the
wider characteristic of the nation—whilst the homophobia of the external Other is
essentialised as an inherent cultural characteristic of the nation, signifying their back-
wards masculinity that still relies on a homophobia as a technology of Othering.
Imagined as being an intolerant nation, the Other is thus depicted as inherently inferior.
26 I use Bhomonegativity^ here to refer to individual attitudes towards homosexuality in order to avoid
conceptual confusion in the usage of the term homophobia.
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Consider, for example, the discourses in Western European media on the 2014
Eurovision Song Contest entry and winner Conchita Wurst. Ulbricht et al. (2015)
demonstrated that notion of tolerance was mobilised for intolerant ends in the context
of the reporting on Eurovision. They argued that Bsupport for LGBT rights and anti-
homophobia are rallied around […] in order to denigrate a particular identity: Eastern
Europeans. In this discursive move, Eastern Europeans are presented as backwards and
Other, whereas the West can present itself as the site of enlightened tolerance^ (pp.
167–168). Homophobic statements made by elites in Eastern Europe were presented in
Western media as proof of the homophobic nature of Eastern Europe, whilst similar
statements by elite figures in the West were no such indication of the existence of a
homophobic nation.
The difference between heteronationalism and homonationalism, then, is the loca-
tion of homophobia as a technology of Othering within the different types of Self/Other
relations. Heteronationalism draws from homophobia to enforce the nations one mas-
culine image by excluding homosexuals or effeminate masculinities from the nation—
to demark both internal and external boundaries—and to claim the dominant position in
the masculine hierarchy of nations. Homonationalism, on the other hand, targets
homophobia as a political problem foreign to the nation. In other words, it is the
Other’s use of homophobia as a technology of Othering that is used to position it as
inferior. Homonationalism thus relies on the masculine Othering process of
marginalisation to reaffirm the hegemonic position of a tolerant masculinity that (at
least at a utilitarian level) values diversity vis-à-vis the homophobic pre-modern
masculine nations. Doing so, homophobia is located outside the national Self and
presented as the ultimate defining feature of the national Other.
Because both remain embedded within the heteronormative structure, it becomes
possible for both versions of nationalist Othering to co-exist, albeit directed at different
Others and within a different set of relations. When this occurs, the homophobic
Othering of heteronationalism must be performed in a subtler way akin to Pascoe’s
(2007) fag discourse, so that the homonormative homosexual bodies remain included
within the nation. As an illustration of how these different homonationalist and
heteronationalist masculine processes of Othering can co-exist in one space, it is worth
revisiting the case of Afrikaner nationalism. Whereas I have already discussed how
Afrikaner nationalism has used political homophobia to draw its internal boundaries
and exclude those who object conscription from the nation, Conway (2009) has
demonstrated how the 1987 electoral campaign of the National Party in Hillbrow
Johannesburg employed a Bgay rights^ campaign in order to recreate Hillbrow as a
white area. Appealing to white gay man as a minority group, gay rights were Bconflated
with the preservation of white minority rights against the supposed threat of black
majority domination^ in an attempt to preserve the apartheid regime (p. 862). Another
example is located within the Israeli state, which Puar (2013, p. 338) has described as
Ba pioneer of homonationalism^, where the inclusion of LGBT bodies Bparallels the
concomitant increasing segregation of Palestinian populations.^ The inclusion of gays
in the Israeli imagined state has come at the cost of those who are imagined not to
contribute to the BIsraeli ‘common good’ (most notably Palestinians, but also
genderqueers, pacifists, and many others)^ (Milani and Levon 2016, p. 72). More
importantly, the way in which gay identities are included is consistent with the previous
mentioned technologies of Othering of Zionism. Indeed, Milani and Levon (2016) have
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argued that, in Israeli homonationalism, the Israeli gay man is produced through images
of young muscled men, which draws on Zionism’s history of representing Israel
through the picture of the sabra, the Byoung, strong, masculine Jew, who unlike its
older, more ‘feminine,’ and weaker counterpart in the diaspora would build the state of
Israel^ (p. 79). They further argue that the gay Jew is not integral to the construction of
the Zionist-Israeli identity, but rather the
hypermasculine character of the traditional figure of the sabra […] is skilfully
mobilised for the Beconomic exploitation of eroticization^. Muscular virility is
skilfully […] deployed in order to tickle the Bpornographic imagination^ of
international viewers, and thus generate a global attraction for a normative ideal
of Israeli masculinity, and, by proxy, for Israel. And while it is the leisure sporty
facet of the gay sabra that it is foregrounded […], his warrior-like Bdouble^ is
never too far away. (p. 80, references omitted)
The underlying presence of the warrier-like image of the muscular Jew cannot be
ignored as it draws attention the military as a major site of the (re-)creation of the
masculine image of Israeli nation. The processes through which the national Self is
(re)produced within the military perfectly demonstrate how the different masculine
technologies of Othering are compatible and can co-exist within nationalism. Indeed,
although gay men are able to serve in the army since the 1990s and are now
instrumental in the Othering of the homophobic Palestinian Other, it has been demon-
strated that the military continues to use homophobia as a technology of Othering to
police the masculine combat soldier image associated with the nation. The latter,
however, does not occur through the usage of explicit homophobic language but rather
by equating poor performances with childlessness and femininity—those characteris-
tics associated with the Bunwanted effeminate Jew^ (Zaccai 2012; for more on the
construction of a nationalist compatible gay identity, see Levon 2014).
Conclusion
To date, the theorising of nationalism and masculinities has remained relatively mar-
ginal in the literature. When the link between these two phenomena is analysed, the
focus is often on the overlapping substantive features of both hegemonic structures. As
such, the theorising about the connection between masculinity and nationalism relies on
a particular notion of nationalism and masculinity, both embedded in a
heteronormative, homophobic and patriarchal framework. Such views, this article
argues, rely too much on a substantialist tradition of thought that is in sharp contrast
with the literature’s emphasis on the flexible nature of the nation’s boundaries and of
(hegemonic) masculinities. It does not allow for the possibilities of different expres-
sions of masculinities and nationalism to be connected.
In this article, I am providing an alternative theoretical formulation of the relation
between masculinities and nationalism, which aims to understand how the processes
that maintain both hegemonic structures overlap and reinforce each other. Thus,
drawing on insights from relational sociology, the article has argued that the link
between the hegemonic structures of masculinities and nationalism can be understood
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in their reliance on similar technologies of Othering. Focusing on the location of
homophobia as a mutual technology of Othering within the Othering process, I argue
that nationalism is best conceptualized through the notion of competing masculinities,
in which other nations are (re)produced through either subordinate or marginalised
masculinities. Such conceptualisation recognises that the imagining of the nation is
always connected to the imagining of the Other and also occurs in response to how the
nation is envisioned in competing nationalisms (i.e., as a reaction to its positioning and
imagining in the Othering processes of different nations). Put differently, the imagining
of the nation through masculine processes is transactional and happens in relation the
existing Othering processes within its relational field.
An important contribution of the proposed theoretical framework is that it overcomes
the apparent duality between homonationalism and heteronationalism. It conceptualises
both phenomena as two sides of the same coin. The difference between these is the
location of homophobia as a technology of Othering within different type of Self/Other
relations. Heteronationalism draws from homophobia as a technology of Othering to
imagine the Self through the processes of contradiction (drawing internal and external
boundaries to exclude non-masculine Others), and to claim the dominant position in the
masculine hierarchy of nations. Homonationalism, on the other hand, uses the process of
contrast to target homophobia as a political problem foreign to the nation, i.e., homo-
phobia is the defining feature of the nation’s Other, inherently positioning the Other as
less than. In other words, both expressions of nationalism rely on masculine technolo-
gies of Othering, albeit with different features of masculinity being emphasised and
contrasted with either subordinated or marginalised masculine features.
By conceptualising nationalism as competing masculinities, I provide an analytical
tool that allows us to contextualise and understand seemingly contradicting features of
nationalism and its relationship to masculinities. Moreover, by situating nationalist
Othering within a field of relations with multiple others, the presented theory of the
relationship between nationalism and masculinities allows for the study of and reflec-
tions on the temporality of these Othering processes, including issues of (dis)continuity
or disconnected/interrupted continuities and flexibility/fluidity of masculine imagining
of the nation’s boundaries.
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